以前覺得經濟學人是神
作者: spock () 看板: Tech_Job
標題: Re: [新聞] 經濟學人︰全球半導體 恐剩三家存活
時間: Mon Apr 6 07:24:48 2009
原文網址：
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13405279
The semiconductor industry
Under new management
新型管理之下的半導體產業
Apr 2nd 2009 | DRESDEN
2009 年 4 月 2 日 作者：德瑞斯登
From The Economist print edition
轉載自「經濟學人雜誌」印刷紙本
Chipmakers were suffering even before the global economic downturn.
晶片製造商於全球經濟走下坡之前，早已遭到打擊。
Recession is heightening the pain and highlighting changes in structure
and ownership.
不景氣只是加重它們的痛苦，並凸顯其結構與經營權的改變。
MOST tourists come to Dresden to view the city’s architectural wonders.
來到德勒斯登的觀光客，大多為了參觀此城市壯觀的建築。
Beautifully rebuilt, the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady), for instance,
reveals no hint that its huge cupola once crumbled after a rain of British
bombs.
以二戰之後重建，美麗的德勒斯登聖母教堂為例。其壯觀的穹頂，全然無法看出當年
曾經遭受英國空軍如落雨般投下的炸彈轟炸。
But the capital of the German state of Saxony also has more contemporary
attractions—at least for technically inclined travellers.
但是身為德國薩克森自由州的首都，於現代有更為吸引人之處────至少是對於瞭解
科技的旅客來說。
It is the hub of one of Europe’s biggest technology clusters.
德勒斯登是歐洲規模最大的科技園區。
Silicon Saxony, as the region has come to be called, boasts 1,500 high-tech
firms employing 43,000 people, most of them in the semiconductor industry.
這個地區被稱為「矽薩克森」，以一千五百家高科技公司、四萬三千名員工著稱，大多
是半導體產業。
Yet industrial tourists had better hurry.
不過，想到此參觀半導體產業的遊客，再遲就來不及了。
Recently Silicon Saxony has taken some hits that have weakened its
foundations.
最近「矽薩克森」的半導體產業遭到幾次衝擊，已經削弱了它的基石。
On April 1st Qimonda, a maker of memory chips and the cluster’s largest
employer, mothballed its factory, having been forced into insolvency earlier
this year.
奇夢達，一家製造記憶體的公司，亦是園區僱有最多員工的雇主，於四月一日關閉工廠
，被迫提早宣佈破產。
Its last hope is to be bought by an outside investor lured by money from
the Saxon government.
奇夢達最後的一線生機，來自於薩克森自由州政府所引介的外商投資者。
Inspur, a Chinese computer-maker, is among those expressing interest in
Qimonda, which has developed some cutting-edge technology.
「浪潮」，一家中國電腦製造商，是對於奇夢達發展的尖端科技，表示興趣的眾多
投資者之一。
At Dresden’s other big “fab”, as chip-fabrication plants are called, is an
indicator of another change that may prove just as damaging.
在德勒斯登其他的半導體晶圓廠，不景氣帶來的改變，可能僅代表著更多損失。
There is a new logo at the entrance: visitors are no longer welcomed to AMD
but to Globalfoundries.
工廠的大門換上了新的標誌：歡迎訪客的不再是「超微」，而是「Globalfoundries」。
AMD, a maker of microprocessors for personal computers (PCs), decided last
year to spin off its fabs into a separate company and to sell a majority stake
to investment funds controlled by the government of Abu Dhabi.
「超微」是一家製造個人電腦微處理器的公司，去年決定把它的晶圓廠獨立為子公司，
並出售其多數的股權給一個阿布達比政府掌控的投資基金。
A good deal of production, some fret, may eventually move from Dresden to the
Gulf.
工廠大部分的產能，往後可能逐漸從德勒斯登轉移到波斯灣。
The likely death of Qimonda and the birth of Globalfoundries have turned
Silicon Saxony into an industrial showcase of a very different kind.
奄奄一息的奇夢達與 Globalfoundries 的誕生，把「矽薩克森」轉變為截然不同的產業
展覽。
It is a visible token of how hard recession around the world has hit the
semiconductor industry, which had already been weakened by one of its periodic
downturns.
它代表著不景氣如何嚴重打擊半導體產業，而且早已遭受景氣循環下坡的衝擊。
Just as important, it demonstrates the longer-term upheavals in the industry.
同等重要的是，它示範著半導體產業長期的劇變。
The semiconductor business is becoming less vertically integrated and more
concentrated.
半導體產業逐漸減少其垂直整合的程度，更加集中於少數公司。
And its centre of gravity is shifting eastwards.
而它的重心漸漸轉向東方。
Despite a few signs that the worst may be over—Asian chipmakers’ share
prices
soared recently after shortages were predicted—the industry is still in the
midst of the longest slump in its 50-year history.
雖然有徵兆顯示最壞的時刻已經過去────在預期資金短缺之後，最近亞洲晶片製造商
的股價飆高────半導體產業仍然陷入五十年來最長期的衰退。
If market researchers are right, it will shrink again in 2009 before resuming
growth in 2010. iSuppli, one such forecaster, thinks that revenues will fall
by more than 20% this year, to $205 billion (see chart 1).
如果市場研究正確，半導體產業將在 2009 年再次萎縮，而在 2010 年由黑轉紅。
iSuppli，一家市場研究公司，預測今年半導體產業的營收將減少超過百分之二十，
即 2050 億美元。（表一）
Other observers have been making similarly gloomy predictions.
其他的觀察家，也作出相似的悲觀預測。
To understand why the semiconductor industry has been so pummelled, think of
integrated circuits (ie, chips) not as tiny pieces of silicon engraved with
millions of transistors, but as an essential resource.
想要瞭解半導體產業為何遭受如此巨大的衝擊，必須先認為積體電路（也就是晶片）
不是許多蝕刻有上百萬電晶體的小矽片，而是一種民生資源。
Before long every man-made object will come with at least one embedded
microchip (see chart 2).
未來所有人造的物品之中，都至少會有一顆嵌入其中的微晶片。（表二）
Jerry Sanders, AMD’s founder, once called chips “the crude oil of industry
”.
超微的創辦人，傑瑞．山德斯，曾經稱晶片為「工業的原油」。
This seems apt: integrated circuits have become the grease of the information
economy.
這樣形容得很貼切：積體電路已經成為資訊經濟不可或缺的一員。
The flip side is that chipmakers have come to depend increasingly on the
health of the rest of the economy.
另一方面來說，晶片製造商的榮枯，逐漸依賴其他經濟面是否健全。
The chip cycle
晶片的景氣循環
However, the industry’s own economics are also to blame.
但是，半導體產業本身的經濟面也是一個重要因素。
Even without the world’s wider troubles, these would have caused problems.
就算沒有全球性的不景氣，半導體產業自己也有問題。
In explaining how, Dan Hutcheson, chief executive of VLSI Research, a
consultancy, likens semiconductor manufacturing to a different industry:
farming.
丹．哈徹森，超大型積體電路研究公司的總裁，在訪談中以農業作為比喻，解釋半導體
工業的現況。
Investment decisions have to be made long before products can be sold.
半導體產業如同農業一般，遠在產品賣出的時刻之前，就必須作出投資決策。
Chip farmers have to spend billions and wait years before they can start
etching circuits onto “wafers”, those thin disks of semiconductor material,
the size of pizzas, which are sliced into hundreds of chips at the end of the
production process.
這些晶片的農夫，必須先投資超過數十億美元，並且等待好幾年，才能開始把電路蝕刻
到晶圓上頭。晶圓是薄圓盤狀的半導體材料，如同披薩般大小。晶圓在製造過程的最後
才被切割為數百顆晶片。
This goes a long way towards explaining why chipmakers, like farmers, have a
tendency to oversupply the market, particularly if they sell memory chips, an
undifferentiated product (like winter wheat).
這麼長的比喻，解釋了為什麼晶片製造商如同農夫，傾向於供應市場過多的產品。尤其
是銷售記憶體晶片的廠商，因為各家的產品沒有太大的區別。（類似冬麥）
Even if prices fall below costs, they have an interest in keeping their fabs
humming, in order not to lose their heavy upfront investment and to recover
the variable costs.
即便銷售價格低於成本，晶片製造商寧願讓晶圓廠繼續生產，才不會損失先前鉅額的
投資，並期望回收各項成本。
What is more, they are caught on a “technology treadmill”, in the words of
Mr Hutcheson.
更有甚者，哈徹森形容這些廠商被困在「科技跑步機」上原地跑步。
Competition forces them always to employ the latest technology, which both
increases output and puts pressure on prices.
激烈的競爭，迫使半導體公司必須使用最新的科技，在提昇晶片生產量的同時，也提高
產品成本。
Finally, just as in agriculture, governments further fuel this innate
tendency to oversupply.
最後，如同農業，政府的政策也更進一步推動供過於求的傾向。
In prestige, national security, industrial policy or just a desire to create
jobs, politicians have always found a reason to support their semiconductor
industries, mostly with cash.
基於國家面子、國防安全、產業政策、或是提供工作，政客永遠會找到支持半導體產業
的理由，尤其是現金資助。
Silicon Saxony, for instance, has received more than €1.5 billion (nearly $2
billion at today’s exchange rate) from the state of Saxony alone, much of it
to coax AMD into investing.
以「矽薩克森」舉例來說，接受薩克森自由州政府超過 15 億歐元的投資（以今日的
匯率來說，超過 20 億美元），大多是為了吸引超微投資。
Asian governments have been the most active.
亞洲政府最為熱心。
Thanks to Taiwan’s industrial policy, more than half of the world’s chips
are now made there.
因為台灣政府的產業政策，如今全球超過半數的的晶片都在台灣製造。
Support from the South Korean government made Samsung and Hynix the world’s
biggest makers of memory chips; they supply about 50% of this segment.
在南韓政府的扶持下，產生了三星與海力士這兩家全球最大的記憶體晶片製造商；
它們供應全球大約 50% 的記憶體。
China seems intent on turning its semiconductor companies into market leaders
at almost any price, above all Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation, or SMIC.
中國看來決心要不計任何代價，讓自己的半導體公司成為市場龍頭，也就是中蕊國際。
All this explains why of the 40 fabs under construction in 2007, 35 were in
Asia, three in America and only two in Europe.
這就解釋了 2007 年還在建造的 40 家晶圓廠，為何有 35 家位於亞洲，3 家在美國，而
只有 2 家在歐洲。
Not surprisingly, at times supply far outstrips demand.
當市場供過於求的時候，其結果並不令人意外。
From 2002 until last year Asian makers of memory chips, especially, invested
as if capital were free—which explains why everybody is now bleeding money.
從 2002 年到去年，尤其是亞洲的記憶體製造商，投資鉅款有如免費一般────所以現
在
每一家廠商都在鉅額虧損。
In July 2007 the price of a DRAM (dynamic random access memory) chip with a
capacity of 512 megabits was more than $2.
2007 年七月時，512 Mb DRAM（動態隨機存取記憶體）晶片的價格還高於 2 美元。
In early April it was about 50 cents. Smaller makers cannot cope.
到了今年四月初，只剩下 50 美分。規模較小的廠商紛紛倒閉。
Qimonda, for instance, piled up losses of about €1.5 billion between October
2007 and June 2008.
以奇夢達為例，從 2007 年十月到 2008 年六月之間，就損失了約 15 億歐元。
Its revenues were only €1.3 billion.
它的營收只有 13 億歐元。
Given the scale of the losses and the screaming from other industries,
governments look less inclined to help this time.
因為半導體產業損失太重，同時其他產業也在大聲呼救，此時政府較不願意出手援助。
Even Taiwan is having second thoughts about an ambitious plan to save its
memory-chip industry, announced only last month.
即使是台灣，在上個月宣佈了一項拯救記憶體晶片產業的大膽方案，也仍然猶豫不決。
The idea is to merge and bail out the country’s six makers of memory chips,
which have lost $12.5 billion in the past two years and accumulated $11
billion in debts.
此項方案將合併與拯救該國六家記憶體製造商。這些廠商在兩年之內虧損了 125 億
美元，總共累積負債 110 億美元。
Even if Taiwan were to let these firms fail, which is highly unlikely,
supply would still exceed demand, according to iSuppli.
就算台灣政府聽任這些公司倒閉，雖然不太可能這樣，根據 iSuppli 的預測，
市場仍然會持續供過於求。
Global sales of memory chips will not start growing again before next year.
全球記憶體晶片的銷售量，直到明年都會持續衰退。
And growth will not reattain its 2006 rate before 2015.
直到 2015 年之前，其成長率都不會達到 2006 年的數字。
Whatever happens to Qimonda and its Taiwanese rivals, the current crisis
is sure to speed up two seemingly contradictory long-term trends in the
industry.
無論奇夢達或是它台灣的對手結果如何，目前半導體產業的危機仍然會因為兩種
互相矛盾的長期趨勢而繼續惡化。
It is consolidating, in that the manufacture of chips is becoming
concentrated among fewer companies.
目前已經可以確定，晶片製造將會逐漸集中在少數的公司手上。
At the same time, it is splitting up, in that more companies are
specialising in design, and contracting out or quitting the making of chips.
同時，也會有更多的公司分散開來，專注於晶片設計，將晶片製造外包給其他公司，
或是放棄製造晶片。
Both developments are mainly the consequence of what has come to be called
“Moore’s Second Law”, an economic counterpart to a better known observation
by Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel, the world’s biggest chipmaker
by revenue.
這兩種趨勢都是所謂「摩爾第二定律」的後果，相對於全球營收最大的晶片製造商
英特爾的創辦人之一，戈登．摩爾，其廣為人知的「摩爾定律」。
The original Moore’s Law is usually summarised thus: the number of
transistors on a chip doubles every 18 months.
原本的摩爾定律如下：每隔 18 個月，晶片上的電晶體數量倍增。
In fact Mr Moore first predicted this would happen every year and later
changed his forecast to every two years; the average has become his law.
實際上，摩爾一開始預測是每年倍增，後來改為每兩年倍增。結果兩個數字的平均
成為他著名的定律。
Mr Hutcheson points out that Mr Moore made more than a purely technical
prediction.
哈徹森指出，摩爾所作出的不僅僅是科技方面的預測。
He also stated that the cost of an integrated circuit would stay the same,
a halving of the cost per transistor with every doubling of the number.
他同時也指出，積體電路的成本仍將維持一定，導致數目倍增等於成本減半。
This has turned out to be essentially correct, but progress has come at a
high
price.
這項預測基本上是正確的，但是達成預測結果的過程十分昂貴。
The ever more sophisticated equipment required to make semiconductors
has been getting dearer with every iteration of Moore’s Law.
為了達成摩爾定律所預測的數目，製造半導體晶片的設備也愈來愈複雜（昂貴）。
The most advanced chips are built using 32-nanometre technology, meaning that
transistors are now so tiny that more than 4m can fit on this full stop.
目前最先進的晶片使用 32 奈米科技製造，代表現在一次可以製造超過四百萬顆電晶體。
（此處無法確定 4m 的原意，暫且如此翻譯）
Lithographic tools for transferring Lilliputian circuitry onto a wafer cost
up to $50m a pop.
將這些極小的電路轉刻在晶圓上的蝕刻設備，一套超過 5000 萬美元。
To reach the economies of scale needed to make such investments pay,
chipmakers must build bigger fabs.
要回收如此鉅額投資所需的經濟規模，晶片製造商必須建造更大的晶圓廠。
Rising fixed costs give rise to Moore’s Second Law: as the cost of
transistors
comes down, the cost of fabs goes up, albeit not at quite the same rate.
固定成本增加，衍生出摩爾的第二定律：電晶體成本下降的同時，晶圓廠的成本上升，
雖然兩者的比率不一定相等。
In 1966 a new fab cost $14m. By 1995 the price had risen to $1.5 billion.
1966 年建造一座新的晶圓廠需要 1400 萬美元。1995 年的造價上漲到 15 億美元。
Today, says Intel, the cost of a leading-edge fab exceeds $6 billion,
including all the preparatory work.
今日，以英特爾為例，最先進的晶圓廠成本超過 60 億美元，包括所有前期準備。
And the Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has built two
“GigaFabs” for between $8 billion and $10 billion each, which would buy you
four nuclear power stations.
台灣積體電路製造公司已經建造兩座「十億晶圓廠」，造價約為 80 億美元與一百億
美元，相當於四座核能發電廠的價格。
The output of such monsters depends on the mix of products, but they each
could easily churn out 3 billion chips a year.
這些巨型晶圓廠的產量取決於產品的種類，但是它們每年可以輕易製造出 30 億顆晶片。
These ever-increasing costs and the need for specialisation have caused the
industry to splinter, says Derek Lidow, iSuppli’s chief executive.
持續增加的成本與專業分工，讓半導體產業四分五裂，iSuppli 的總裁，德瑞克．立多
如是說。
Originally, all chipmakers were vertically integrated, meaning they designed
the chip, built the tools to make them, ran the fabs and added the necessary
connectors.
一開始，所有的晶片製造商都是垂直整合的，表示它們從設計晶片、建造製作晶片的設備
、開設晶圓廠、以及其中所需的元件都是一手包辦。
As costs went up and certain activities became more and more complex, they
were spun out to spread expenses and know-how.
當成本增加，其中某些製程變得愈來愈複雜，這些領域就獨立出來，以分散成本與技術。
Semiconductor equipment, design software and packaging have long been done
by separate companies.
半導體製造設備、晶片設計軟體、與晶片封裝，長期以來都由不同的公司所掌控。
But the past ten years have seen the rise of “fabless” firms, which merely
design integrated circuits.
但是過去十年來，許多「無晶圓廠」的公司興起，它們只設計積體電路。
Now established chipmakers can no longer afford to develop their own
manufacturing processes or even to run their own fabs.
目前的晶片製造商，已經無法開發自主的製程技術，甚至無力建造自己的晶圓廠。
To share the pain, IBM, Samsung and others have teamed up to use chipmaking
technology jointly.
為了分攤成本，IBM、三星、與其他公司早已組成聯盟，共同使用一樣的晶片製造技術。
Some firms, such as Texas Instruments, have chosen to go “fab-lite”,
meaning
that they have their own fabs only for certain chips.
某些公司，例如德州儀器，決定採取「晶圓廠為輕」的策略，表示它們自己的晶圓廠
只生產某幾項晶片。
Others, such as AMD, have spun off manufacturing completely (although AMD’s
decision had much to do with a lack of cash after it bought ATI, a maker of
graphics chips, for $5.4 billion in 2006).
其他公司，例如超微，將製造廠完全獨立出來（雖然這項決策，與超微在 2006 年以
54 億美元併購 ATI 之後缺乏現金有關。ATI 是一家繪圖晶片製造商）
Hence the rise of “foundries”, the smelters of the information age.
所以，隨著晶圓代工廠的崛起，資訊時代也愈來愈高度發展。
These are essentially contract manufacturers.
晶圓代工廠是必需的合約製造商。
Although far from household names, they are huge companies, churning out
about one quarter of the world’s semiconductors.
雖然晶圓代工廠的名號罕為人知，它們可是巨型的公司，製造出全世界四分之一的
半導體產品。
The biggest, TSMC, has a manufacturing capacity greater even than Intel’s.
其中最大的一家，台灣積體電路製造公司，比英特爾的產量還大。
Its revenues grew at an annual average rate of 13% for several years, topping
$10.6 billion, before falling by almost a third in the last quarter of 2008.
它的營收以每年平均增加 13% 持續數年，最高達到 106 億美元，直到 2008 第四季驟降
了幾乎三分之一的營收。
TSMC also illustrates a corollary of Moore’s Second Law: even the biggest
chipmakers must keep expanding.
台灣積體電路製造公司也反映了摩爾第二定律：即使是最大的晶片製造商，也必須持續
擴張。
Intel today accounts for 82% of global microprocessor revenue and has annual
revenues of $37.6 billion because it understood this long ago.
英特爾今日佔有全球微處理器 82% 的營收，每年營收 376 億美元，就是因為它老早就
深暗這個道理。
In the early 1980s, when Intel was a $700m company—pretty big for the time—
Andy Grove, once Intel’s boss, notorious for his paranoia, was not satisfied.
在 1980 年代早期，當英特爾是一家市值 7000 萬美元的公司────當時已經十分巨大
────安迪．格洛夫，曾經是英特爾的老闆，以他的妄想聞名，對此並不滿意。
“He would run around and tell everybody that we have to get to $1 billion,”
recalls Andy Bryant, the firm’s chief administrative officer.
「他會到處視察，並且告訴每個人，我們一定要達到 10 億美元。」安迪．布來恩特，
英特爾的首席行政長回憶道。
“He knew that you had to have a certain size to stay in business.”
他知道你必須達到一定的規模才能生存。
Grow, grow, grow
成長、成長、再成長
Intel still appears to stick to this mantra, and is using the crisis to
outgrow its competitors.
英特爾看來持續唸著這句魔咒，並且利用半導體產業的危機，遠遠甩開競爭者。
In February Paul Otellini, its chief executive, said it would speed up
plans to move many of its fabs to a new, 32-nanometre process at a cost of
$7 billion over the next two years.
今年二月，包爾．奧特利尼，英特爾的總裁，宣佈英特爾將花費 70 億美元，提早把
自己的眾多晶圓廠，於兩年之內轉換為新的 32 奈米製程。
This, he said, would preserve about 7,000 high-wage jobs in America.
他說這個計畫將在美國境內保留約七千個高薪的職位。
The investment (as well as Nehalem, Intel’s new superfast chip for servers,
which was released on March 30th) will also make life even harder for AMD,
Intel’s biggest remaining rival in the market for PC-type processors.
這項投資（與 Nahalem，英特爾為伺服器推出的新高速晶片，三月三十日上市）將讓
超微的日子更難過，超微是英特爾在個人電腦微處理器市場上唯一的競爭對手。
Two other long-term developments also point towards further concentration
of chipmaking.
另外兩項長期的發展，也指出晶片製造將更為集中。
The first is technological change beyond that ordained by Moore’s Law.
第一項是摩爾定律所預言不到的科技變化。
Fully automated “lights-out” fabs are in operation.
已經有無人的全自動「熄燈」晶圓廠開始運作。
Within a few years fabs will be producing wafers with a diameter of 450mm,
up from 300mm now, making them even more productive.
幾年之內，晶圓廠將會從目前直徑 300 公釐（十二吋）到製造直徑 450 公釐（十八
吋）的晶圓，晶片的產能將大為增加。
“When the industry goes to 450mm and this happens at 22 or even 11
nanometres, it is conceivable to have one factory handle all our needs as a
company,” says Mr Otellini.
「當半導體工業開始製造 450 公釐的晶圓，進入 22 甚至 11 奈米技術，我們相信
一家擁有一座晶圓廠的公司，就可以滿足我們所有的需求。」奧特利尼如是說。
He adds, however, that Intel would never put all its eggs in one basket.
他補充道，但是英特爾絕對不會把所有的雞蛋放在同一個籃子裡。
The other development is the maturing of the industry.
另一項發展，則是半導體產業的成熟期。
Its annual growth has slid from double digits in the mid-1990s to an
average of around 5% since then.
半導體產業自從 1990 年代中期兩位數的年成長率，已經下滑到現在的 5% 左右。
And since 2004 the profitability of chip firms has dropped steadily as
many chipmakers have lowered prices to expand their markets.
而且自從 2004 年開始，晶片公司的獲利率就持續下降，導致許多晶片製造商開始
削價競爭以擴張市場。
In the future, only three types of semiconductor firm will make a decent
return, predicts Mr Lidow: those with unique intellectual property; those
happy to make commodity chips; and those with enough cash to achieve
unprecedented scale.
未來，只有三種半導體公司能夠存活，立多預測道：擁有特殊智慧財產的公司；樂於
製造普通晶片的公司；以及銀彈充足，規模難以望其項背的公司。
How far will consolidation go? High-ranking executives at leading firms,
who prefer not to be quoted, give similar answers.
這樣的情景何時會成真？幾位不願具名，知名公司的高階主管給予雷同的答案：
In the long run, they say, there will be only three viable entities, at
least at the leading edge of chipmaking: Samsung in memory chips, Intel in
microprocessors and TSMC in foundries.
長遠來看，他們說道，只會有三種公司留存，至少是三個晶片製造的龍頭：製造
記憶體晶片的三星、製造為處理器的英特爾、與晶圓代工的台灣積體電路製造公司。
The rest will be “nationalistic” ventures in need of regular government
bail-outs.
其他的公司將會成為各國政府冒險投注的保釋者。
Yet such predictions may be a little off the mark.
不過，這種預測可能過於偏激。
Largely because of that nationalism, the semiconductor industry is
unlikely to end up as a bunch of near-monopolies.
主要是因為國家主義，半導體產業不太可能變成幾家公司壟斷的狀態。
The Taiwanese are unlikely to let the South Koreans rule the memory roost.
台灣人不大可能任憑南韓支配記憶體產業。
The newly founded Taiwan Memory Company (TMC), which is to take over the six
local firms, could become the core of a global memory giant.
新成立的台灣記憶體公司，合併六家台灣公司而成，可能會成為全球記憶體市場的王者。
It will hook up with Elpida Memory, Japan’s sole maker of memory chips.
這家公司將與爾必達記憶體公司合作，爾必達是日本唯一的記憶體晶片製造商。
TMC is also said to be interested in Qimonda.
台灣積體電路製造公司也傳聞有可能收購奇夢達。
Precious pizza
昂貴的披薩
As for microprocessors, in the fast-growing market for netbooks and other
mobile devices, Intel has to do battle with many “fabless” firms, most of
which build chips based on designs by ARM, a British company.
微處理器的市場在筆記型電腦與其他的行動裝置上快速成長，英特爾必須與眾多
「無晶圓廠」公司戰鬥，其中大多是基於 ARM 晶片的設計。ARM 是一家英國公司。
What is more, after spinning off manufacturing, “our customers no longer
have to ask: is AMD able to invest in the next generation of manufacturing?”
says Dirk Meyer, the firm’s chief executive.
再者，超微分離製造部門之後，「我們的顧客不必再問：超微是否有能力投資下一世代
的製造技術？」超微的總裁，德爾克．梅爾如是說。
And Abu Dhabi’s investment in Globalfoundries is part not just of its
preparations for the post-oil age, but also of a long-term plan to create a
“global” alternative to foundries in Taiwan and mainland China.
而且阿布達比對於 Globalfoundries 的投資，不只是為了後石油世紀作出準備，也是
長期計畫，想創造立於台灣、中國大陸之外的另一個全球晶圓代工廠。
The company will build a fab in New York state and perhaps one day in the
Gulf state.
Globalfoundries 將在紐約州建造一座晶圓廠，也許將來會在波斯灣區域建立晶圓廠。
Whatever the precise number of firms, the semiconductor industry will be
highly concentrated and much of it will be dominated by Asian companies.
無論未來會剩下多少公司，半導體產業都會集中在少數公司上，而且大部分是亞洲公司
所掌握。
Does this matter? From a purely economic standpoint, probably not much.
這樣好嗎？從純經濟的觀點來看，並沒有什麼。
The industry’s extreme capital-intensity is certainly a barrier to entry,
and in theory a market with only a few suppliers is ripe for rigging.
半導體工業極端資本集中，建立起難以進入的障礙，而且理論上一個只有少數供應者
的市場，也已經到了成熟期。
But chipmakers are unlikely to be able to extract a disproportionate rent
or restrict supply—or even to try.
但是晶片製造商很難達到高度的獲利，或是降低供給────它們更不敢嘗試如此。
For one thing, the industry has a history of intense competition.
因為半導體產業的歷史是激烈的競爭史。
This is especially fierce among Asian national champions, for which prestige
plays a big role.
亞洲國家龍頭公司之間的競爭尤其激烈，其中最大的原因是面子問題。
More important, the global production network of the information-technology
industry is much too interdependent.
更為重要的是，資訊科技產業的全球製造網路，已經彼此密不可分。
If foundries, for instance, took a much larger piece of the pie, others in
the value chain, such as chip designers, would find it hard to survive.
舉例來說，如果代工廠的所佔的利潤太高，其他在獲利鏈之中的公司，如晶片設計商，
將會難以生存。
From a political perspective, the shift towards Asia could matter much
more—especially for Europe.
從政治的角度來看，半導體產業偏向亞洲發展的趨勢，對於歐洲特別要緊。
Although America has lost much of the “back end” of chipmaking—the packing
and testing—to Asia, it still is the home of many leading-edge fabs, notably
those run by Intel.
雖然美國已經喪失大部分製造晶片「後端」給亞洲────封裝與測試的部份，美國仍然
有許多最先進的晶圓廠，大部分是英特爾所有。
Intel’s finances, thanks to its dominance, are still healthy, but the big
European chip firms such as STMicroelectronics (revenues of $9.8 billion in
2008), Infineon Technologies ($6 billion) and NXP Semiconductors ($5.4
billion) are struggling.
英特爾的財務，歸功於它的霸主地位，仍然非常健全。但是一些歐洲的大型晶片公司，
例如意法半導體（2008 營收 98 億美元）、英飛凌科技（60 億）、NXP 半導體
（54 億）正在泥淖中求生。
NXP has just announced a financial restructuring to lighten its debt burden
of nearly $6 billion.
NXP 才剛剛宣佈一個財務重建計畫，以減輕它接近 60 億美元的負債壓力。
Worse, over the past ten years Europe’s market share in semiconductors has
dropped from more than 23% to about 15%, according to Future Horizons, a
consultancy.
更糟糕的是，過去十年來，歐洲的半導體市場佔有率從超過 23% 降到約 15%，這是由
諮商公司 Future Horizons 所提供的數字。
A recent report by the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA),
a lobbying group, listed some of the reasons for this erosion: the
appreciation of the euro, much more generous subsidies in other regions and
lagging R&D spending.
最近一份由歐洲半導體產業協會，一個遊說團體，所發表的報告，其中列出幾項市佔
萎縮的原因：高價的歐元、其他競爭國家對於半導體產業的高額補助、以及落後別人
的研發經費。
If governments do not act soon, the report concludes, chipmakers will
continue to migrate elsewhere and put Europe’s competitiveness at risk.
如果政府不及時採取行動，這份報告總結道，歐洲的晶片製造商將會外移，危及歐洲
的競爭力。
Although sophisticated chips are an essential ingredient of many European
exports, from cars to medical equipment, the answer is unlikely to be a
splurge of taxpayers’ money.
雖然許多歐洲的外銷品之中，從汽車到醫療儀器，都必需使用精密的晶片，但是解決
此一問題的答案，並不是拿納稅人的血汗錢補貼半導體產業。
A lot has already been spent on manufacturing, to create jobs.
納稅人的錢已經有一大部分，花費在晶片製造上頭，以製造工作機會。
But this approach will work even less well in the future.
但是如此的方法，在將來會愈來愈不可行。
Trying to draw level with Asia in chipmaking would be futile.
嘗試與亞洲在晶片製造上競爭，將會徒勞無功。
What is more, although there has been a lack of spending on research, the
real problem has been a lack of successful commercialisation.
而且，雖然沒有研究證實，真正的問題是缺乏成功的商業化模式。
What Europe’s semiconductor industry—and its technology sector as a whole,
for that matter—badly needs is a better environment for entrepreneurs, says
Dan Breznitz of the Georgia Institute of Technology, a specialist in the
global IT industry.
歐洲半導體產業────以及整個相關的科技領域────迫切需要一個更好的企業環境
，
丹．布瑞茲尼次，喬治亞科技學院的全球資訊科技產業專家如是說。
Because Europe’s semiconductor industry has been dominated by big,
hierarchical companies, fabless firms are still rare.
因為歐洲的半導體產業一直由大型的、階層的公司所主導，無晶圓廠公司非常罕見。
In Israel, by contrast, with its newly entrepreneurial culture, they have
multiplied.
在以色列，相對來說，他們有著新的企業文化，無晶圓廠公司的數量呈倍數成長。
Europe, argues Mr Breznitz, is still too focused on manufacturing.
在歐洲，不同意布瑞茲尼次的論點，仍然過於重視晶片製造。
Europe could stage a comeback, some say, should an old idea finally take off:
“mini-fabs”—small, flexible and agile production units. Such a revolution
has
happened before, in steel: giantism once seemed insuperable, yet today plenty
of steel is made in “mini-mills”, which use scrap as raw material.
有人說歐洲可以捲土重來，一個舊觀念終將成功：「小晶圓廠」────小型、富有彈性
、
機動調整的製造單位。過去曾有類似的革命，即鋼鐵生產：巨型鋼鐵廠曾經看起來穩如泰
山，而今日大部分的鋼鐵是製造於「小鋼鐵廠」，它們回收廢鐵作為原料。
Might the foundries of the information age one day be under a similar threat?
Maybe.
資訊時代的晶圓代工廠，將會有這麼一天，面對類似的挑戰嗎？也許會。
But experts are right to be sceptical: transistors may get ever smaller, but
in chipmaking scale rules.
但是專家們維持懷疑的態度也有其道理：半導體也許會變得更小，但是晶片製造的規模才
是王道。
翻譯：Spock 2009.4.6.
—
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
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